Jihadists for Hire:
Black Market PMCs Spreading Terror Tactics Globally
Written by Aries D. Russell
Fighters from ‘Yurtugh Tactical’ conduct live-fire drills in Idlib, Syria. Composed of Uyghur jihadist veterans, the group functions as a PMC-style unit—providing 'train, advise, and assist' capabilities to other insurgent factions in the region. Specializing in infantry tactics, CQB, and speed shooting, they are seen here with customized 5.45x39mm AK-74 rifles.
How battlefield trainers, digital propaganda, and tactical alliances are forging a new industry of militant professionals.
Iran has long used proxy militias to extend its influence across the middle east and surrounding regions, supporting non-state armed groups with weapons, funding, and training[1].
Among the most successful of these proxies is Yemen’s Houthi movement, which has transformed from a local rebellion into a billion-dollar insurgent enterprise[2]. With deep support from Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Hezbollah, the Houthis now wield a growing arsenal of drones, missiles, and naval capabilities, funded through illicit smuggling networks and maritime extortion[3].
Houthi fighters have travelled covertly, to receive advanced training in Iran, Lebanon, and Iraq[4]. Skills once reserved for state militaries, like missile assembly and drone coordination, have since been absorbed and internalized by Houthi units. But crucially, that knowledge doesn’t stay in Yemen.
Trained individuals and tactical consultants are now surfacing in conflicts far from their original battlegrounds, offering services for profit or shared cause[5]. This diffusion helps explain why Middle Eastern insurgent tactics are increasingly seen in Africa and elsewhere. A particularly revealing example of this tactical export is the emerging partnership between the Houthis and Somalia’s al Shabab[6]. Despite sectarian divides, the Houthis are Zaidi Shia, and al Shabab are Sunni jihadists, their alliance is pragmatic.
According to UN monitors, the Houthis have supplied weapons to al Shabab in exchange for logistical assistance and operational support. Somali pirate networks have helped divert and distract naval patrols, enabling arms shipments to reach Houthi forces by sea[7]. Many of these weapons have been traced back to Iranian-origin stockpiles, underscoring Tehran’s indirect but critical role in expanding militant capabilities beyond the Middle East.
Global Mercenaries: Jihadist PMCs Without Borders
Beyond the reach of state-sponsored militant networks, a more decentralized and entrepreneurial phenomenon has emerged: the rise of jihadist private military contractors (PMCs)[8]. These are seasoned foreign fighters who offer tactical training, battlefield support, and operational consulting to extremist groups, sometimes for money, often for ideology.
The most notorious of these is Malhama Tactical[9], a Syria-based outfit founded by Uzbek veterans linked to al-Qaeda affiliates. Frequently dubbed “the world’s first jihadi PMC,” Malhama functioned like a freelance jihadist special operations unit. Its operatives trained militants from Jabhat Fateh al-Sham and other insurgent factions, blending frontline experience with a sophisticated social media presence. Their success set a precedent, proving that jihadist veterans could monetize their skills just like Western contractors, albeit with radically different clientele.
Since Malhama’s rise, others have followed. Units such as Muhojir Tactical, Yurtugh Tactical, and Albanian Tactical have professionalized the model, embedding themselves primarily within Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and other rebel coalitions. These groups offer advanced capabilities, from sniper instruction and CQB to night operations, trauma medicine and drone warfare tactics.
Albanian Tactical, for instance, has trained newer formations like Yurtugh Tactical, while Muhojir Tactical regularly publishes multilingual training content on heavy weapons and urban warfare. Increasingly, these groups train alongside one another, creating a transnational network of jihadi special operations trainers. Their tactics now circulate not just on battlefields, but across digital ecosystems, Telegram, Instagram, and closed forums, where instructional videos double as propaganda and recruitment tools.
A growing body of evidence suggests that foreign veteran fighters, especially those trained in Syria and Iraq, are rotating between jihadist conflicts, spreading tactical knowledge across networks in the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia. These individuals often operate informally or under the umbrella of groups like Malhama Tactical, Muhojir Tactical, and Albanian Tactical, serving as embedded trainers or operational advisors. Analysts warn that this phenomenon is likely to expand, as these groups frame themselves as battlefield professionals and contract-ready entities.
According to the National Defense University, jihadist mercenary units may soon become a regular feature of global conflict, offering “special forces” capabilities to extremist clients in future insurgencies[10].
Profiles of key jihadist PMC-style units operating in Syria. While varying in origin and focus, all share a common role as specialized training and combat-support groups embedded within broader insurgent networks
Tactical Spillover: The Houthi–Al Shabab Nexus
The Houthis’ growing partnership with al Shabab offers a case study in tactical cross-pollination. In 2024, UN investigators reported multiple meetings between the two groups to coordinate strategy[11]. Houthis shipped small arms, including machine guns and sniper rifles, to al Shabab. In return, al Shabab and Somali pirates ramped up attacks in the Gulf of Aden, drawing naval forces away and creating smuggling windows for Houthi weapons[12].
But the relationship isn’t limited to arms. Somali sources confirmed that delegations of al Shabab fighters travelled to Houthi-controlled ports in Yemen for training. There, Hezbollah and Houthi instructors introduced them to drone deployment, missile coordination, and asymmetric warfare techniques previously unseen in East Africa[13].
Intercepted drone shipments and real-time targeting coordination in recent Red Sea attacks suggest that al Shabab may have directly supported Houthi operations, blurring the lines between ideological ally and tactical enabler.
In July 2025, Houthi forces executed a highly sophisticated, multi-domain attack on commercial shipping, combining long-range missiles, suicide UAVs, explosive-laden naval drones, and fast-attack skiffs.
These naval drones—remote-controlled boats packed with explosives—rammed into civilian vessels, contributing to the sinking of two cargo ships and killing several crew members. The attack resulted in direct vessel losses estimated at $15–20 million, drove up war-risk insurance premiums, and triggered widespread rerouting of commercial shipping, adding costs that could total tens of billions of dollars globally.
The operation’s complexity and coordination suggest that regional partners, including al Shabab, may have assisted with surveillance, targeting data, or maritime strike coordination.
This transactional exchange, combat skills traded for access or logistics, represents a new frontier in insurgent collaboration. What began as an Iranian investment in a Yemeni proxy is now influencing conflicts hundreds of miles away.
Drone Warfare: The Global Tactic of Choice
Nothing illustrates the spread of modern militant tactics better than the proliferation of drone warfare. Once the preserve of advanced states, UAVs are now ubiquitous across insurgent groups. Inexpensive, versatile, and difficult to intercept, drones have levelled the battlefield, especially for non-state actors[14].
The Houthis have led this transformation with Iranian-designed systems adapted for long-range strikes and maritime targets. But their tactics have rapidly migrated. In mid-2024, Puntland authorities in Somalia seized suicide drones linked to Houthi stockpiles enroute to al Shabab[15].
In Nigeria, Boko Haram and ISWAP have used surveillance drones against the military[16]. Mozambique and Mali have both reported insurgent drone sightings, with some attacks involving jury-rigged payload releases that mimic ISIS and Houthi tactics[17].
These trends point to a tactical pipeline. Techniques honed in the deserts of Syria or the mountains of Yemen now reappear in Africa’s savannas and coastal jungles. Online forums, encrypted comms, and foreign trainers serve as the vectors. The result: militant groups that learn and evolve faster than conventional armies can adapt.
A Global Syndicate of Tactics and Trainers
From Hezbollah mentors in Yemen to Uzbek snipers in Syria to pirate-facilitated arms routes in Somalia, today’s militant landscape increasingly resembles a global syndicate. This isn’t just about ideology, it’s about logistics, consulting, and cross-border specialization. What was once taught in Afghan caves is now delivered through drone footage, Telegram tutorials, and battlefield mentorships.
Jihadist PMCs are the accelerators. These outfits, from Malhama Tactical to Albanian Tactical, now operate like transnational special operations trainers, freelancing across conflicts, exchanging tactics, and exporting battlefield know-how. The result is a world where a bombing in Burkina Faso might mirror tactics refined in Idlib, or where a Somali drone technician replicates Houthi maritime targeting.
This isn’t random adaptation, it’s the emergence of a combat knowledge economy, where fighters trade in doctrine, not just ideology.
The rise of jihadist mercenaries and tactical exporters has made militant networks more agile, interconnected, and resilient to traditional counterterrorism strategies. Governments are no longer confronting isolated insurgents but a hydra-like ecosystem of localized grievances fused with global expertise.
If this model takes hold in Libya, Afghanistan, or West Africa, the West won’t just face jihadist groups, it will confront a decentralized industry of militant professionals. Countering it will require more than surveillance or airstrikes. It will demand a shift in mindset—one that accounts for digital logistics, ideological subcontracting, and the marketization of militant talent.
Written by Aries Russell
Managing Director, Aries Intelligence
[1] CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies). "War by Proxy: Iran's Growing Footprint in the Middle East." https://www.csis.org/analysis/war-proxy-irans-growing-footprint-middle-east
[2] GNET (Global Network on Extremism and Technology). "Cash Flow: Breaking Down the Houthis' Multibillion-Dollar Financial Networks." https://gnet-research.org/2025/05/14/cash-flow-breaking-down-the-houthis-multibillion-dollar-financial-networks/
[3] This is Beirut. "Houthis: What Military Power?" https://thisisbeirut.com.lb/articles/1309715/houthis-what-military-power
[4] Reuters. "Iran, Hezbollah enabled Houthis' rise, says UN report." https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-hezbollah-enabled-houthis-rise-says-un-report-2024-09-26/
[5] Syria Justice and Accountability Centre. "Militant Enterprises: The Jihadist Private Military Companies of Northwest Syria." https://syriaaccountability.org/militant-enterprises-the-jihadist-private-military-companies-of-northwest-syria/
[6] RUSI (Royal United Services Institute). "Beyond the Axis: Yemen's Houthis are Building their 'Network of Resistance'." https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/beyond-axis-yemens-houthis-are-building-their-network-resistance
[7] Lloyd’s List. "Houthi threat to shipping growing thanks to 'unprecedented' network of support."
https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1151228/Houthi-threat-to-shipping-growing-thanks-to-unprecedented-network-of-support
[8] Syria Justice and Accountability Centre. "Militant Enterprises: The Jihadist Private Military Companies of Northwest Syria." https://syriaaccountability.org/militant-enterprises-the-jihadist-private-military-companies-of-northwest-syria/
[9] Middle East Institute, National University of Singapore. "Insight 262: Malhama Tactical – The Evolving Role of Jihadist Mercenaries in the Syrian Conflict."
https://mei.nus.edu.sg/publication/insight-262-malhama-tactical-the-evolving-role-of-jihadist-mercenaries-in-the-syrian-conflict/
[10] National Defense University Press. "Mercenaries and War: Understanding Private Armies Today."
https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/article/2031922/mercenaries-and-war-understanding-private-armies-today/
[11] New Lines Magazine. "A Pact Between Al-Shabab and the Houthis Threatens Red Sea Shipping." https://newlinesmag.com/spotlight/a-pact-between-al-shabab-and-the-houthis-threatens-red-sea-shipping/
[12] Ibid
[13] Institute for Security Studies (ISS Africa). "Houthis in Somalia: friends with technological benefits?"
https://issafrica.org/iss-today/houthis-in-somalia-friends-with-technological-benefits
[14] International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). “The UAV Threat from Non-State Actors.”
In: The Military Balance 2023, IISS. https://www.iiss.org/publications/the-military-balance
[15] ADF Magazine. "Suicide Drone Discovery in Somalia Signals Shift in Terror Tactics."
https://adf-magazine.com/2024/09/suicide-drone-discovery-in-somalia-signals-shift-in-terror-tactics/
[16] Deutsche Welle (DW). "Nigeria: ISWAP extremists launching attack drones."
https://www.dw.com/en/iswap-extremists-launching-attack-drones-in-nigeria/a-72241455
[17] Sentrycs. "From Surveillance to Strikes: The Escalating Drone Threat in Africa."
https://sentrycs.com/the-counter-drone-blog/from-surveillance-to-strikes-the-escalating-drone-threat-in-africa/