Thailand-Cambodia Flashpoint

26 July 2025

THE CURRENT SITUATION:

Hostilities erupted on 23 July 2025 following the detonation of a landmine near the Thai-Cambodian border, injuring several Thai soldiers. It remains unclear who was responsible for the initial incident, but it served as a trigger for rapid military escalation between the two sides.[1]

In the days that followed, a series of airstrikes and artillery exchanges occurred across several contested regions. Notably, the Royal Thai Air Force conducted bombing runs against Cambodia’s 8th and 9th Infantry Divisions near the border area.[2] These represent the most significant use of combat airpower in the bilateral relationship to date.

Civilian infrastructure has also been impacted. A Cambodian hospital was struck during retaliatory actions, and a Thai petrol station in Sisaket province was hit by Cambodian artillery. The civilian toll includes at least 14 Thai deaths and one Cambodian fatality, with over 120,000 civilians displaced on both sides.[3] Military casualties include one confirmed death each for Thailand and Cambodia, with dozens more wounded.

The sudden intensification of violence has raised concerns about a potential spiral beyond traditional border clashes. The situation is further complicated by domestic political instability in Thailand, where Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra was suspended on July 1st following the leak of a phone call with former Cambodian leader Hun Sen.

The conservative Thai military establishment, historically at odds with the Shinawatra dynasty[4], may find strategic benefit in using the conflict as a pretext to assert greater authority in the ongoing political struggle.

THE GEOPOLITICAL BACKGROUND:

Underlying tensions have persisted between Thailand and Cambodia for decades, due to unresolved border issues dating back to the colonial period. Chief among them is the Preah Vihear temple, which remains a potent nationalist symbol on both sides of the border.[5] Despite International Court of Justice rulings in 1962 and 2013 awarding sovereignty over the temple to Cambodia[6], resentment continues to fester amongst Thai political leadership.

Both nations are deeply embedded within broader Asia-Pacific power dynamics. Thailand is designated a major non-NATO ally by the United States[7] and is a regular participant in regional defence exercises such as Cobra Gold and RIMPAC.[8] At the same time, it maintains deep security[9] and economic ties with China.[10]

Cambodia remains more closely aligned with Beijing. The Ream Naval Base, located on the Cambodian coast and partially funded by China, has hosted visiting PLAN (People’s Liberation Army Navy) vessels and is widely regarded as a key strategic asset in China's regional maritime posture.[11]

While Cambodia has in recent years sought diplomatic diversification, including greater outreach to Europe and India, its defence posture remains heavily China-dependent.

Although regional organisations such as ASEAN have expressed concern and offered to mediate, they are expected to remain neutral bystanders. ASEAN’s principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states means it is unlikely to intervene decisively in such disputes. The organisation has historically remained strictly unaligned and uninvolved in similar past regional crises.

THAI AND CAMBODIAN DEFENCE CAPABILITIES OVERVIEW
(All figures from IISS Military Balance 2025)[12]

Thailand:

Thailand enjoys overwhelming military superiority over Cambodia in nearly every domain.

With a population of nearly 70 million and a mandatory conscription system (24-month liability for men without prior reserve training), Thailand fields a well-equipped and capable force with both quantitative and qualitative advantages.

The Royal Thai Armed Forces consist of approximately 360,000 personnel (including 140,000 conscripts), supported by some 200,000 reservists and 45,000 paramilitary personnel.

Two-thirds of Thai Armed forces are concentrated within the Army, organised around 14 combined-arms divisions. While much of the heavy equipment dates back to the 1980s, recent procurement cycles have introduced modern armoured vehicles, artillery, and precision-guided munitions into the force.

Thailand’s edge is even more pronounced in the air and at sea. The Royal Thai Navy operates around a dozen Principal Surface Combatants, in addition to Southeast Asia’s only aircraft carrier, the HTMS Chakri Naruebet (now functioning as a helicopter carrier). The Royal Thai Air Force is regarded as one of the most capable in the region, with a fighter inventory of approximately 70 aircraft (mostly F-16A/Bs and Gripens), along with Erieye AEW&C platforms, ISR drones, and small-scale satellite assets including two Napa cubesats.

Cambodia:

Cambodia’s military position is significantly weaker, constrained by limited industrial capacity, modest budgets, and dated equipment.

With a population of around 17 million, its conscription system officially mandates 18 months of service, but this policy has been inconsistently enforced since its suspension in practice in 1993.

The Cambodian military comprises approximately 124,000 active-duty personnel, primarily concentrated within the Army and Provincial Forces. A further 67,000 paramilitary troops are available, although their capabilities are more suited to internal security and civil contingencies than conventional warfare.

Much of Cambodia’s ground equipment is Cold War-era Soviet hardware, with limited recent upgrades sourced from China, most notably a battery-equivalent of multiple rocket launchers (MRLs).

Its air and naval services are functionally minimal. The Royal Cambodian Navy is restricted to a few coastal patrol vessels with no anti-ship missile capability.

Similarly, the Royal Cambodian Air Force has no frontline combat aircraft. Ground-based air defences are restricted to man-portable systems (MANPADS) and a single reported battery of Chinese HQ-12 medium-range SAMs, which are broadly similar in role and capability to the US MIM-23 Hawk.

BUDGETS AND INDUSTRY:

Thailand’s 2025 defence budget was approximately US$5.67 billion, more than four times larger than Cambodia’s. The Vision 2026 programme, alongside two White Papers released in 2024, outline targeted procurement goals and technological upgrades.

A key feature of Thailand’s strategy is its growing emphasis on offsets and technology transfers, as seen in its partnerships with South Korea, Sweden, and China. The Defence Technology Institute (DTI), established in 2009, plays a central role in driving indigenous R&D and production capability.

By contrast, Cambodia allocated roughly US$1.30 billion to defence in 2024. The country remains heavily reliant on Chinese military assistance, with Russia playing a smaller role in recent years.

Following the imposition of a symbolic US arms embargo in 2021, Cambodia has further strengthened defence-industrial cooperation with China.

While defence modernisation is prioritised by the government, a combination of budgetary shortfalls, dependency on foreign suppliers, and an underdeveloped domestic industrial base continues to limit progress.

STRATEGIC OUTLOOK:

With numerous civilians already killed, the confirmed use of offensive airpower, and over 120,000 people displaced, the conflict has surpassed the bounds of traditional border clashes.

The core question now is whether either side, particularly Thailand, chooses to pursue further escalation, or whether diplomatic efforts can contain the situation and prevent a full-scale conflict.

While a major war remains unlikely, several plausible scenarios/ramifications warrant consideration:

• Short, decisive exchange followed by diplomatic accords and ceasefire (most likely outcome)

• Extended but localised military confrontation with protracted ground skirmishes and ISR activity

• Political uncertainty in Thailand, including efforts by the military to assert its power, particularly if nationalist sentiment is greatly inflamed

• Indirect Chinese involvement, primarily through ISR and logistics support or diplomatic backchannelling.

• Humanitarian fallout, especially if civilian infrastructure continues to be targeted, could draw international scrutiny or multilateral mediation

The coming 72–96 hours will thus be decisive in shaping whether the situation stabilises, or spirals further.

Written by Kevin Ong,

Co-authored by Aries Russell

[1] Panarat Thepgumpanat, “Thai‑Cambodian fighting extends into third day despite ceasefire calls,” Reuters, July 26, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/thai-cambodian-fighting-extends-into-third-day-despite-ceasefire-calls-2025-07-26/. 

[2] Panu Wongcha-um, Chantha Lach, and Panarat Thepgumpanat, “Thai fighter jet bombs Cambodian targets as border battle escalates,” Reuters, July 24, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/thai-fighter-jet-bombs-cambodian-targets-border-battle-escalates-2025-07-24/.

[3] “Thailand-Cambodia clashes kill at least 15 as 130,000 flee border area,” Al Jazeera, July 25, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/7/25/death-toll-in-thai-cambodia-clashes-rises-to-16-as-120000-flee-border-area

[4] “Thailand’s PM Paetongtarn Shinawatra suspended over leaked call with Cambodian leader,” The Guardian, July 1, 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jul/01/thailands-pm-paetongtarn-shinawatra-suspended-over-leaked-call.

[5] “Thailand and Cambodia: The Battle for Preah Vihear,” Stanford University - Stanford Program on International and Cross-Cultural Education (SPICE), accessed July 26, 2025, https://spice.fsi.stanford.edu/docs/thailand_and_cambodia_the_battle_for_preah_vihear.

[6] “Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Merits, Judgment of 15 June 1962,” International Court of Justice, https://www.icj-cij.org/node/103120.

[7] “Major Non‑NATO Ally Status,” U.S. Department of State, accessed July 26, 2025, https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status.

[8] “RIMPAC Participants,” U.S. Pacific Fleet, accessed July 26, 2025, https://www.cpf.navy.mil/About-Us/Exercises-Missions/RIMPAC/Participants/.

[9] “Southeast Asia’s arms suppliers, by the numbers,” Lowy Institute, accessed July 26, 2025, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/southeast-asia-s-arms-suppliers-numbers.

[10] “China,” Observatory of Economic Complexity, accessed July 26, 2025, https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/tha/partner/chn.

[11] Simon Eaton, “A Tale of Two Reams: Questions Remain at Cambodia’s Growing Naval Base,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (CSIS), May 2025, https://amti.csis.org/a-tale-of-two-reams-questions-remain-at-cambodias-growing-naval-base/.

[12] https://www.iiss.org/publications/the-military-balance/